Thanks to the sponsorship of multiple companies, I have been paid to work 11 hours on Debian LTS this month.

I started by doing lots of triage in the security tracker (if you want to help, instructions are here) because I noticed that the dla-needed.txt list (which contains the list of packages that must be taken care of via an LTS security update) was missing quite a few packages that had open vulnerabilities in oldstable.

In the end, I pushed 23 commits to the security tracker. I won’t list the details each time but for once, it’s interesting to let you know the kind of things that this work entailed:

• I reviewed the patches for CVE-2014-0231, CVE-2014-0226, CVE-2014-0118, CVE-2013-5704 and confirmed that they all affected the version of apache2 that we have in Squeeze. I thus added apache2 to dla-needed.txt.
• I reviewed CVE-2014-6610 concerning asterisk and marked the version in Squeeze as not affected since the file with the vulnerability doesn’t exist in that version (this entails some checking that the specific feature is not implemented in some other file due to file reorganization or similar internal changes).
• I reviewed CVE-2014-3596 and corrected the entry that said that is was fixed in unstable. I confirmed that the versions in squeeze was affected and added it to dla-needed.txt.
• Same story for CVE-2012-6153 affecting commons-httpclient.
• I reviewed CVE-2012-5351 and added a link to the upstream ticket.
• I reviewed CVE-2014-4946 and CVE-2014-4945 for php-horde-imp/horde3, added links to upstream patches and marked the version in squeeze as unaffected since those concern javascript files that are not in the version in squeeze.
• I reviewed CVE-2012-3155 affecting glassfish and was really annoyed by the lack of detailed information. I thus started a discussion on debian-lts to see whether this package should not be marked as unsupported security wise. It looks like we’re going to mark a single binary packages as unsupported… the one containing the application server with the vulnerabilities, the rest is still needed to build multiple java packages.
• I reviewed many CVE on dbus, drupal6, eglibc, kde4libs, libplack-perl, mysql-5.1, ppp, squid and fckeditor and added those packages to dla-needed.txt.
• I reviewed CVE-2011-5244 and CVE-2011-0433 concerning evince and came to the conclusion that those had already been fixed in the upload 2.30.3-2+squeeze1. I marked them as fixed.
• I droppped graphicsmagick from dla-needed.txt because the only CVE affecting had been marked as no-dsa (meaning that we don’t estimate that a security updated is needed, usually because the problem is minor and/or that fixing it has more chances to introduce a regression than to help).
• I filed a few bugs when those were missing: #762789 on ppp, #762444 on axis.
• I marked a bunch of CVE concerning qemu-kvm and xen as end-of-life in Squeeze since those packages are not currently supported in Debian LTS.
• I reviewed CVE-2012-3541 and since the whole report is not very clear I mailed the upstream author. This discussion led me to mark the bug as no-dsa as the impact seems to be limited to some information disclosure. I invited the upstream author to continue the discussion on RedHat’s bugzilla entry.

And when I say “I reviewed” it’s a simplification for this kind of process:

• Look up for a clear explanation of the security issue, for a list of vulnerable versions, and for patches for the versions we have in Debian in the following places:
• The Debian security tracker CVE page.
• The associated Debian bug tracker entry (if any).
• The description of the CVE on cve.mitre.org and the pages linked from there.
• RedHat’s bugzilla entry for the CVE (which often implies downloading source RPM from CentOS to extract the patch they used).
• The upstream git repository and sometimes the dedicated security pages on the upstream website.
• When that was not enough to be conclusive for the version we have in Debian (and unfortunately, it’s often the case), download the Debian source package and look at the source code to verify if the problematic code (assuming that we can identify it based on the patch we have for newer versions) is also present in the old version that we are shipping.

CVE triaging is often almost half the work in the general process: once you know that you are affected and that you have a patch, the process to release an update is relatively straightforward (sometimes there’s still work to do to backport the patch).

Once I was over that first pass of triaging, I had already spent more than the 11 hours paid but I still took care of preparing the security update for python-django. Thorsten Alteholz had started the work but got stuck in the process of backporting the patches. Since I’m co-maintainer of the package, I took over and finished the work to release it as DLA-65-1.